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It has become customary to say that racism has no place in something –
in sport, in our organisation, in 2020, in society. The expression has been
much repeated in the global response to the killing of George Floyd, but
it was already current in the UK as a result of the travails of the
Corbyn‐led Labour Party; people often prefaced their interventions in
the debate on anti‐Semitism by declaring that racism of any kind has
no place in the Labour Movement; and indeed the official Labour leaflet
on the subject is entitled No Place For Antisemitism. The formula has
something irresistible about it; when anyone wants to make their
abhorrence of racism publicly clear, these are the words that are likely
to spring to their lips.
What is its force? Most obviously, it is a claim to complete thorough-
ness, rather like the expression ‘zero tolerance’, which had an analo-
gous vogue a few years ago. ‘Place’ adds a faint territorial metaphor,
as if the organisation is a landscape where racism, like an escaped
criminal, is seeking refuge in vain. He will not elude us; we will look
behind every bush! This hyperbolic assurance is amplified, too, by the
impersonal form of the statement: the speaker does not promise to
deny racism a place, but states absolutely that it does not have one. In-
tention assumes the authority of fact: Carthago delenda est. The
speaker is adopting, as if for the camera, an expression of implacable
determination.
That is what it looks like from a rhetorical point of view, but if instead
we think about it formally, the same gesture of conspicuous objectivity
appears as an equivocation about what kind of speech act this is. There
is no place for racism in football – the existential clause suggests a sim-
ple constative utterance, analogous to There is no basis for life on Mars.
It looks as if what is being advanced is a factual proposition which could
be confirmed or questioned by reference to empirical evidence. But
actually no one takes it in that sense. To retort, for example, that racism
observably does have a place in most professional football grounds,
would show a wilful misunderstanding of the original utterance. It only
sounds constative: it is really a performative, spoken not to describe the
absence it enunciates, but to decree it.
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This tension has implications for its politics. After all, it is not just
that racism is present as a matter of fact in sport, society, business,
and all the other fields of activity where it is said to have no place.
It is also that this fact is precisely what the speaker is insisting on.
The whole point of the declaration is to focus attention on the racism
that is, or at the very least may be, inherent in the organisation, and
to promise redoubled efforts to combat it. If a particular organisation
were literally and totally free of racism, it would be vacuous for its rep-
resentative to declare that racism had no place in it: well, of course
not. In effect, then, to say that there is no place for racism is to say
that it is present. In this sense the two levels of the utterance – its ep-
istemic and deontic modes, so to speak – do not so much coexist as
collide.
The effect of the collision is to make the political gesture a maximal
one. It undertakes to extirpate racism entirely, so that there will be
nothing left of it, but in the same breath it represents it as endemic.
So the stated aim appears as utopian: it proposes not a change in policy
or law, but a different world. This is not an accidental implication: it is
an explicit theme of BLM polemic that the racism of Western societies
is structural, and that overcoming it therefore entails revolutionary
transformation, not just liberal adjustment. The formula does bear the
traces of that politics in its imagery of root‐and‐branch change; but the
more it is repeated by mainstream speakers, the fainter this radical in-
tonation inevitably becomes. An elementary Google search shows that
there is, officially, no place for racism in the media multinational
Bertelsmann, in the English Premier League, in the US armed forces,
in the international community of birdwatchers, or in society as it is per-
ceived by Boris Johnson. It is hard to see this list as a coalition for rev-
olutionary change.
However, there is another way of hearing the absoluteness of the
expression, its solemn refusal of all compromise: namely, as piety. The
declaration that racism has no place in our society, repeated by a great
variety of spokespersons in almost identical words, has a ritual character
which suggests that the underlying speech genre is religious. Racism is,
after all, well equipped to occupy the conceptual place traditionally occu-
pied by sin. Like sin, it is axiomatically bad; unlike, say, war, or inequal-
ity, whose value in certain circumstances can be defended, it has nothing
to be said for it; even racists usually say they are against it. Like sin, it is
polymorphous. It can’t be reduced to a kind of politics (like Fascism), or a
kind of action (like violence), or a kind of feeling (like phobia), or a kind of
injustice (like unequal pay), or a kind of historical institution (like slav-
ery); rather, it is all those things and more. Laws, states, people,
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narratives, images, jokes, blindnesses, impulses, practices, and omis-
sions can all be racist, and racismdoesn’t inhere in any one of these forms,
but is the malign principle that underlies them all and constitutes their
essence. Like sin, too, it is at once an original fatality and an individual
responsibility: it afflicts its inheritors through the ineluctable logic of
centuries, but in such a way that each of them is nonetheless personally
guilty. It is thus the accusation against which there is no defence: ‘If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in
us.’ (1 John 1: 8). It is striking that for the current generation there is only
one word that is really taboo, and that word is not either blasphemous or
indecent like the banned words of the past, it is racist. This confirms, I
think, that racism is approaching the status of a (negatively) sacred
object. Hence the air of constrained proprietywithwhich CEOs and social
media managers queue up to testify that racism has no place in their
organisations. They are not being insincere or cynical – or at least, there
is no need to suppose so. Rather, they are people in church, reciting the
General Confession.
It can certainly be argued that for practical purposes this is no bad
thing. If high‐profile people and powerful institutions are genuflecting to
an anti‐racist imperative, they are to that extent not ignoring or
marginalising it as they were before. But the formula is not altogether a
happy one, even so. Its comprehensive grandeur has a homogenising ef-
fect: if there is no place for any kind of racism, anywhere, then all kinds
of racism are equivalent. All‐white reading lists and murderous attacks,
a rigged electoral system and an insensitive turn of phrase – it is all alike
racist, there is no place for any of it: as in the Calvinist account of human
depravity, sinfulness is a condition with no gradations. And as with Cal-
vinism, the trouble with such a structure of belief is that its monotonous
negativity produces despair, or, as a more palatable alternative to de-
spair, incredulity. The project of an immaculately non‐racist society, in
which the legacy of every past empire and nationalism has been
transcended, and every human group enjoys its own collectivity without
the need to construct negative ‘others’, is not plausible: it is, to pursue
theanalogy, theKingdomofHeaven, fromwhich the sins of theworldhave
beendivinely removed. Short of that apocalypse, politicsmust operate ina
secular sphere, where ‘racism’ is not a singular devil that can be cast out
like a statue being thrown off a quayside, but a protean, interactive, his-
torically actual dimension of our living together, which cannot be eradi-
cated, though it can be opposed, understood, blocked, outflanked,
weakened. Rather than having no place in our society, it has many, and
they are sites of difficult conversation, not easy anathema.
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The language doesn’t stay still. I wrote this piece at the end of August
2020, and on 4 September a letter was sent to US executive agencies by
Russell Vought, President Trump’s director of the Office of Management
and Budget. It stated that federally funded racism awareness
programmes were disseminating anti‐American doctrines and ordered
that this should stop. And it added:
The divisive, false, and demeaning propaganda of the critical race
theory movement is contrary to all we stand for as Americans and
should have no place in the Federal government.
This sentence coopts the formula of anti‐racist piety to reinforce a
direct attack on anti‐racist practice. No doubt Vought was attracted by
its gravitas, its air of commanding the moral high ground. But even
more than that, his misappropriation of the phrase is enabled by its
rhetoric of implacability. As we saw, it enacts an absolute refusal to
admit any exceptions to the prohibition it announces; it is in that sense
an authoritarian locution. It is not so surprising, then, that it fits so
frictionlessly into the discourse of racist bullying. This adaptability
suggests in turn what the trouble is with the language of anti‐racist zero
tolerance. It reduces the conversation to a matter of which side can force
the other to comply – a game in which the victims of discrimination do
not usually have the advantage.
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